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RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR,
ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND COMPACT
FLUORESCENT BULBS: YOU CAN LEAD A
HORSE TO WATER, BUT CAN YOU MAKE IT
DRINK?
Hope M. Babcock*

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite professing to care about the environment and supporting
environmental causes, individuals behave in environmentally
irresponsible ways like driving when they can take public transportation,
littering, or disposing of toxic materials in unsound ways. This is my
fourth exploration of how to encourage individuals to stop behaving
irresponsibly about the environment they allege to care deeply about.
The prior three articles all explored how the norm of environmental
protection could be enlisted in this effort; this Article applies those
theoretical conclusions to the very practical task of getting people to
switch the type of light bulb they use and thus adhere to the concrete
norm of energy conservation.
To help situate this piece better in my prior work, the first article
proposed expanding the abstract environmental protection norm to
include individual environmental responsibility as the approach most
likely to overcome barriers to behavioral change.1 That article
recommended enlisting environmental groups as the most effective
“norm entrepreneurs” to achieve widespread change in personal
environmental conduct.2 The piece concluded that the best way to
change norms and thus change behavior is through education, but that

* Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center. The ideas in this Article were first
presented in abbreviated form at the Symposium on Energy and the Environment at Hofstra
University School of Law, where I received helpful comments from members of the panel and the
audience. I am indebted to my research assistant, Angela Navarro, for her careful editing and to my
colleague at Institute for Public Representation at Georgetown, Jamie Pleune, for her substantive
comments on this Article.
1. See Hope M. Babcock, Global Climate Change: A Civic Republican Moment for
Achieving Broader Changes in Environmental Behavior, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009).
2. Id. at 14, 17; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
909 (1996) (defining “norm entrepreneurs” as “people interested in changing social norms”). When
successful, norm entrepreneurs produce “norm bandwagons,” which are created when small changes
in behavior result in large ones, and “norm cascades,” which happen when there are “rapid shifts in
norms.” Id.
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additional measures might be necessary.3
The second article expanded on the earlier discussion of norms and
their influence on behavior, and why changing norms, though difficult,
is more effective than other means of inciting behavioral change.4
However, given the difficulty inherent in creating or changing norms,
the second article also identified and evaluated several norm- and
behavior-changing tactics, such as shaming, public education, and
market-based incentives.5 That article concluded that no single tactic is
sufficient to secure both norm and behavior change, but that a
combination of any or all of them when properly tailored to the source
and nature of the harm and when accompanied by public education can
lead to both norm and behavioral change.6
The third piece examined how republican theory supports the
critical role of public education in informing and changing norms and
provides the theoretical framework within which norm and behavior
change can occur.7 All three pieces use as a starting premise the theory
that the current crisis over global climate change has created the
circumstances in which norm change can occur—circumstances that
collectively have created what I call a second environmental republican
moment.8 It is during republican moments that individuals are most
amenable to learning about their responsibilities as citizens.9
This fourth Article synthesizes the previous articles into an
assumption about the critical role of norms in changing personal
behavior and tests that assumption by exploring how to make individuals
more responsible consumers of electricity and adhere to the concrete
norm of energy conservation10 by swapping out their incandescent light
bulbs for compact fluorescent lights (“CFLs”).11 The agreed upon goal
3. Babcock, supra note 1, at 17.
4. Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment:
Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 118 (2009).
5. Id. at 159, 165.
6. Id. at 174.
7. Hope M. Babcock, Civic Republicanism Provides Theoretical Support for Making
Individuals More Environmentally Responsible, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 515,
516 (2009).
8. The first occurred during the 1960s and 1970s and culminated in Earth Day. See Daniel A.
Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 66 (1992) (calling
1970 Earth Day, involving participation of twenty million people in various public events, a
“‘republican moment’”).
9. Id.
10. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 137 (discussing concrete norms).
11. The importance of reducing demand for electricity is captured by Chairman Alan Schriber
of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio when he said, “You can build wind generators and solar
panels. All that’s nice, but at the end of the day, reducing consumption is the cheapest way to do
it . . . . By decreasing demand, you forgo the need to continually build [power plants].” Peter Slevin
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behind energy conservation is to reduce the country’s reliance on fossil
fuel-based energy production, thus reducing the emission of harmful
airborne pollutants and greenhouse gases as well as the related
environmental harms associated with coal production.12 One way to
reduce residential energy consumption is to persuade individuals to
switch to CFLs.13 Up to ninety percent of energy produced by
incandescent bulbs is lost as heat; switching to CFLs is one way to
prevent this energy loss.14
However, getting individuals to switch bulbs is not as easy as one
might think because of various barriers that stand in the way of changing
environmental behavior.15 Some of these obstacles are unique to CFLs;
others are more generic. This Article identifies and evaluates the
likelihood of success of two fairly new utility-sponsored initiatives that
are designed to reduce residential energy consumption. This Article also
identifies one more broadly designed initiative to change personal
behavior—to see whether the underlying behavioral motivators in each
of these initiatives could get individuals to swap out their traditional
light bulbs for energy saving CFLs.16
& Steven Mufson, Stimulus Dollars Energize Efforts to Smarten Up the Electric Power Grid,
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2009, at A1.
12. President Obama has made clean energy a centerpiece of his new Administration, part of
which entails reducing the country’s dependence on fossil fuels. See Editorial, Mr. Obama’s Energy
Future, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at A30.
13. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text (discussing the effectiveness of CFLs).
14. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Household Electricity Report, http://eia.doe.gov/emeu/
reps/enduse/er01_us.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). The European Commission recently adopted
regulations that will phase out incandescent light bulbs during the next three years and call for the
use of more energy-efficient alternatives, such as CFLs, to “‘deliver a clear message about the EU’s
commitment to reach its energy efficiency and climate protection targets.’” James Murray, EU
Declares
an
End
to
Inefficient
Bulbs,
BUSINESSGREEN,
Mar.
18,
2009,
http://www.businessgreen.com/2238713 (quoting the European Energy Commissioner, Andris
Piebalgs).
15. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1243 (2001).
16. This Article does not consider the approach of external sanctions, such as fines for
exceeding preset levels of energy use, because of the difficulties that implementing these sanctions
would entail, including the potential for political backlash and the invasion of privacy by the
government to acquire information about consumer behavior from the utilities as well as the high
monitoring and enforcement costs of implementing such a program. See id. at 1235 (“When
numerous people must act to solve a collective problem and lack the economic incentive to do so,
traditional government regulation, such as formal law, may be infeasible, ineffectual, or politically
difficult. The costs of monitoring and enforcement can be prohibitively expensive or may raise
privacy concerns. Many environmental problems are illustrative[, such as] . . . carpooling,
stormwater pollution prevention, [and] energy conservation.”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How
Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes,
75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1276 (2000). (“Heavy handed mechanisms—such as large tolls charged to all
solo commuters, or public campaigns labeling solo commuters as environmental criminals—would
certainly spur a backlash.”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 520 (2004)
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Somewhat to my surprise, and perhaps to the surprise of anyone
who has read my previous work in this area, this Article reaches the
conclusion that the perceived problems with CFLs are sufficiently severe
that no amount of persuasion will induce individuals to acquire them,
despite their individual and social benefits. Rather, structural—what
Professor Ann Carlson calls “architectural”17—changes need to be made
to CFLs to eliminate their negative features and to make their acquisition
and disposal easier before the motivational tools identified in the three
initiatives can have any effect on consumers.
In support of this conclusion, the first Part of this Article provides
some background information on residential electricity consumption to
show why reducing the amount of consumption in this sector is
important and how substituting a single CFL for a traditional
incandescent bulb can contribute to this result. The second Part identifies
various barriers that stand in the way of consumers swapping out light
bulbs, particularly hurdles that are unique to CFLs. The third Part of the
Article describes three different approaches to reducing residential
energy use—smart meters, comparative consumer information, and
personal incentives. This Part identifies the dominant persuasive
technique employed in each of the three approaches. It then evaluates the
effectiveness of these techniques at overcoming barriers to behavioral
change based upon what is known about their use in other contexts
where behavior change was sought.
The final section of this Article pulls together the results of the
previous sections to determine if any motivational technique, alone or in
combination, might induce individuals to adhere to the norm of energy
conservation by purchasing CFLs. Answering this question in the
negative, this Article concludes that behavioral change in this context
will not occur without reducing the structural barriers that stand in the
way, relegating both persuasive techniques and norm-induced behavioral
change to a secondary, albeit still important role.

[hereinafter Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV] (arguing that when regulators have tried “to
impose restrictions on individual behavior[,] . . . the restrictions have been unpopular and have
provoked a public backlash”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of
Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 101 (2003)
[hereinafter Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance] (“[T]he greater the perceived importance of
autonomy, the less likely the individual will respond to threats of formal legal sanctions by
increasing compliance. Instead, when the freedom to conduct an activity is very important,
individuals may react to increased threats to restrict that freedom by simply increasing their
commitment to the illegal activity.”).
17. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1265 (suggesting indirect ways of encouraging environmentally
positive behavior by the use of “[a]rchitectural [m]echanisms” that “facilitate” good environmental
behavior).

2009]

COMPACT FLUORESCENT BULBS

947

II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON RESIDENTIAL ENERGY USE AND
THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF CFLS TO DECREASING THAT USE
Americans consume a lot of electricity, and projections show that
they will continue to consume more rather than less.18 The most
common source of electricity continues to be coal-fired plants,19 which
emit pollutants like particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and mercury, as
well as greenhouse gases.20
In 2001, electricity consumption in the United States totaled 1140
billion kilowatt-hours.21 Since the late 1970s, retail sales of electricity to
U.S. households have exceeded sales to the commercial and industry
sectors.22 In 2003, retail sales of electricity to the residential sector
totaled 1.3 trillion kilowatt-hours.23 The growth in the residential
sector’s share of overall electricity consumption is due to population
growth as well as increasing ownership and electrification of single
family households.24
Electrification of homes and construction of new homes contribute
to this change.25 The largest end uses of electricity in U.S. households in
2001 were central air-conditioning and refrigerators, each accounting for
about fourteen percent of the total residential energy consumed.26 The
18. Recognizing the need to decrease the nation’s reliance on fossil fuel and improve energy
efficiency, over $20 billion included in the stimulus package was earmarked for improving the
efficiency of government buildings and the homes of the poor. Kate Galbraith, Bright Lights, Big
Budget: Nation Prepares for a Flood of Spending on Energy Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009,
at B1.
19. According to the Energy Information Administration, 49.6% of the electricity generated in
2005 was fueled by coal; for the last twelve months of record (through December 2008), this
number dropped slightly to 48.5%. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC
POWER MONTHLY 13 (2009), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/epm.pdf.
20. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the 2005 National Average
Emissions Rate for carbon dioxide, the most common greenhouse gas, from residential electricity
was 1329 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour. EPA, EGRID2007 VERSION 1.1: YEAR 2005
SUMMARY TABLES 1 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/egridzips/eGRID2007V1
_1_year05_SummaryTables.pdf. Google calculates that based on an average of 7.5 tonnes of carbon
dioxide emitted per year per household and 4.5 tonnes of carbon dioxide emitted per year per
conventional car, an energy savings of ten percent for six households would reduce carbon emission
by about the same amount as taking one conventional car off the road. Google.org, Google
PowerMeter Data Sources, http://www.google.org/powermeter/calculation.html.
21. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 14.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. While federal and state efficiency standards have improved the energy consumption of
major appliances like air conditioning systems and refrigerators, turnover in those appliances is
extremely slow. This means that their effect on the total amount of energy consumed per household
per annum is less than what one might otherwise think. However, newer, more efficient refrigerators
and freezers can, to some extent, offset the effect of higher energy consumption from the purchase
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number of households with central air-conditioning rose from twentyseven percent in 1980 to fifty-five percent in 2001, in part due to the
construction of new homes in the southern part of the country.27 The 106
million households with color TVs accounted for thirty-three billion
kilowatt-hours and comprised the largest single home electronics use
that year—VCRs/DVDs, cable boxes, and satellite dishes added sixteen
billion kilowatt-hours to the total.28 Sixty million households had
personal computers, fifty-one million of which had Internet access as
well as printers, accounting for a combined twenty-three billion
kilowatt-hours.29 According to the Energy Information Administration
(“EIA”), over the next twenty years, the demand for electricity to power
household appliances and home electronics, particularly color TVs and
computer equipment, is projected to increase rapidly.30
Although lighting accounted for only 8.8 percent of U.S. household
electricity use in 2001,31 it is one area in which a significant decrease in
residential electricity consumption can be made.32 However, although an
obvious way to reduce the level of residential electricity use is to get
individuals to turn off their lights when not in use, this is difficult to do
because of personal habits, which arise from “‘[r]epeated interactions’”33
and which are a major determinant of individual behavior.34 It is also
of more powerful home office equipment, more extensive home entertainment systems, or
additional kitchen appliances. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The EIA projects electricity consumption for color TVs and computers will grow 3.5
percent annually through 2025 to more than double the level of consumption of those home
electronics in 2003. Id.
31. Id.; see also Walmart Fact Sheets, http://walmartstores.com/FactsNews/FactSheets/
(under “Topics” follow “Sustainability”; then follow “Compact Fluorescent Light Bulbs Fact Sheet”
hyperlink) (attributing “nearly 20 percent of all home electric costs in the U. S.” to lighting).
32. The other obvious area is to have people turn off electric lights when they are not in use.
The barriers to doing this are discussed later in this Article as part of the justification of focusing on
swapping out incandescent bulbs for CFLs. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
33. David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist
Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 301, 313 (2000) (arguing that habits “‘become expectations in the sense of
predictions or anticipations of [individual] behavior,’” which pressure individuals to meet those
expectations “‘partly out of a feeling that the other will be irritated, offended, or disappointed if the
expectation is not fulfilled’” (quoting DENNIS H. WRONG, THE PROBLEM OF ORDER: WHAT UNITES
AND DIVIDES SOCIETY 48 (1994))).
34. See Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 16, at 594-95. Because habits
circumvent decisional processes, they save cognitive time and energy and “habits tend to truncate
the traditional subjective expected utility calculation by creating a ‘habitual mindset.’ . . . Strong
habits also may impede the influence of personal norms.” Id.; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh,
Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW.
U. L. REV. 1101, 1165 (2005) (stating that “many behavior changes that would generate a large
payoff for the individual are blocked by habits or other psychological barriers”). Habits play a
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extremely difficult to get people to refrain from consuming products that
improve the quality of their lives,35 even if they depend on high levels of
electricity, like plasma TVs or digital picture frames.36 These problems
are one reason that attention has focused on increasing the use of
CFLs.37
Incandescent light bulbs, which are found in most households, are
extremely inefficient sources of light because about ninety percent of the
energy used by them is lost as heat.38 CFLs use between one fifth and
one third less power than equivalent incandescent lamps, generate
significantly less heat, and last up to ten times longer.39 If every one of
the 110 million households in the United States replaced a conventional
sixty-watt incandescent bulb with one CFL, the energy saved by that
small action would be enough to power a city of 1.5 million people.40
One swapped-out bulb per house could power all the homes in Delaware
and Rhode Island.41 In terms of greenhouse gases not emitted into the
greater role in maintaining behaviors, such as leaving lights or the computer on, than in making a
single investment, for example by changing a light bulb. See Stephanie Stern, Encouraging
Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral Analysis of Financial Incentives, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
541, 561-62 (2006) (stating that people “prefer to invest in new technology, such as the purchase of
energy-efficient appliances, rather than change their daily behaviors and habits” because they see
these investments as improving the quality of their lives, while behavioral change “is often
experienced as a deprivation”). Habits are even harder to overcome if the new behavior is
inconvenient, requires significant effort, or is costly, like restarting the computer or turning on the
lights every time a room is reentered. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1236.
35. Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. REV.
325, 344-45, 351 (2002) (stating that people “are capable of self-restraint, but it does not come
easily”); see also Babcock, supra note 4, at 122-23 (discussing the environmental problems from
personal consumption); Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675,
723 (2003) (arguing that the phenomenon of the competitive consumer who “continually trades in
goods for the latest model with the latest features” because she “desires . . . to possess something
that relatively few others are capable of attaining, [is] an observable symbol that signifies success
under prevailing social norms”).
36. All Things Considered: Digital Frames Have Environmental Cost (NPR radio broadcast
Feb. 16, 2009) (stating that if each family in the United States had one digital picture frame, the
country would need five new power plants to keep pace with the demand for electricity).
37. An even more efficient bulb, the organic light-emitting diode (“OLED”) is under
development at the Department of Energy. OLEDs will produce approximately 160 lumens of light
per watt compared to traditional incandescent bulbs, which produce only five lumens per watt, and
CFLs, which produce roughly fifty lumens per watt. See Jenny Mandel, Energy Efficiency: DOE
Researcher
Solves
Part
of
Lighting
Riddle,
GREENWIRE,
Mar.
25,
2009,
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2009/03/25/3.
38. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 14.
39. LINDA REMBOWSKI, THE DEFINITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDE TO GOING GREEN FOR
GOOD 25, 57-58 (2009); Walmart Fact Sheets, supra note 31 (“An ENERGYSTAR-qualified CFL
uses about 75 percent less energy than standard incandescent bulbs and lasts up to 10 times
longer.”).
40. Charles Fishman, How Many Lightbulbs Does it Take to Change the World?: One. And
You’re Looking at It, FAST COMPANY, Sept. 2006, at 74, 76.
41. Id.
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atmosphere, one swapped out bulb per 110 million households is equal
to taking 1.3 million cars off the road and would save enough electricity
to turn off two power plants permanently or avoid building the next two,
assuming the demand level for electricity did not creep back up.42
Therefore, if every U.S. household substituted just one CFL for one
incandescent bulb, the savings in electricity and resultant environmental
benefits would be impressive. Just one CFL can prevent 690 pounds of
greenhouse gases from being emitted into the atmosphere and 200
pounds of coal from being burned in power plants.43
The typical U.S. household has between fifty and one hundred
sockets.44 Imagine if individuals switched more than one bulb. The
question is how to motivate each household to swap even one
incandescent bulb for a CFL.
Motivating individuals to change their light bulbs should not be
difficult to do given the obvious environmental benefits of using CFLs
and the public’s strong acceptance of the environmental protection
norm.45 Moreover, unlike refraining from dumping waste motor oil
down a drain or spreading pesticides on a lawn, which have no apparent
benefit to the polluter,46 reducing electricity use has a direct beneficial
effect on the individual in the form of reduced electrical bills.47 A direct
monetary benefit to the individual can act to overcome her temptation to
free-ride on the environmental good works of others and gain the
42. Id.; see also Energy Star, Compact Fluorescent Light Bulbs for Consumers,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=cfls.pr_cfls (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (“If every American
home replaced just one light bulb with an ENERGY STAR qualified bulb, we would save enough
energy to light more than 3 million homes for a year, more than $600 million in annual energy
costs, and prevent greenhouse gases equivalent to the emissions of more than 800,000 cars.”).
ENERGY STAR qualified bulbs use about seventy-five percent less energy than standard
incandescent bulbs and last up to ten times longer. Energy Star, Qualified Compact Florescent Light
Bulbs (CFLs): At a Glance, http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/manuf_res/salestraining_res/
CFL_AtAGlance.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). They save about thirty dollars or more in
electricity costs over each bulb’s lifetime and produce about seventy-five percent less heat, so they
are safer to operate and can cut energy costs associated with home cooling. Id.
43. See Walmart Fact Sheets, supra note 31.
44. Fishman, supra note 40, at 76.
45. See Vandenbergh, supra note 34, at 1117 (stating that the “abstract norm favoring
protection of human health and the environment is widely held, stable, and influential”); see also
Farber, supra note 8, at 65.
46. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 142; see also Carlson, supra note 15, at 1242 (noting that
while proper environmental behavior “produces environmental benefits[,] . . . it remains the case
that these are generalized benefits to the collective not typically viewed as producing any
substantial, immediate benefit at an individual level”).
47. Changing the incandescent light bulbs in an average size house to CFLs can save WalMart customers $350 a year and a typical small business $1325 a year in energy costs. Walmart,
Wal-Mart Surpasses Goal to Sell 100 Million Compact Fluorescent Light Bulbs Three Months
Early, http://walmartstores.com/FactsNews/NewsRoom/6756.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
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collective goods of an improved environment.48 However, there are
many obstacles, which are discussed in the next Part of this Article, that
impede individuals from behaving in conformance with the energy
conservation norm by swapping out their incandescent light bulbs.
III. BARRIERS TO CHANGING LIGHT BULBS
Despite the fact that individuals can save money and thus
experience a direct benefit by switching light bulbs, it is not easy to
motivate them to engage in this activity and adhere to the concrete norm
of energy conservation.49 There are many barriers that stand in the way
of responsible environmental behavior that are difficult to overcome,
even before individuals encounter the specific problems generated by
CFLs.50
A. Barriers to Behaving in an Environmentally Responsible Way
Habits and self interest as well as the inconvenience and cost of the
new behavior and the unavailability of alternatives are examples of
common barriers that must be overcome before individuals will change
their behavior. In addition, the persistence of the myth that only industry
is responsible for environmental harm51 and the difficulty individuals
have understanding how their seemingly minor actions (changing a light
bulb) can accumulate into more serious, widespread harm (polar bears
drowning as the planet warms),52 contribute to the resistance of
individuals to changing their environmental behavior.
Individuals also employ cognitive heuristics (flawed problem
solving techniques) that interfere with how they process information
about environmental harms. This can prevent them from acting in an
48. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1243 (“[If] others engage in the behavior necessary to achieve
the collective good, [one] can free ride on their efforts and still gain the benefits of their behavior.”).
49. The European Union, and Germany in particular, has taken a multi-pronged approach to
getting individuals to reduce the amount of energy they consume. See generally Thomas Daniel
Wuertenber, The Regulation of CO2 Emissions Caused by Private Households – An Analysis of the
Legal Situation in the European Union and Germany, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2009)
(describing the various initiatives, including command and control regulations, loans, subsidies,
metering, and labeling being undertaken by the European Union and Germany to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions by individuals). Interestingly, the United States may be taking a step toward the
European Union’s command and control model with the introduction of the Appliance Standards
Improvement Act of 2009 in the Senate, one provision of which phases out the use of incandescent
light bulbs in portable light fixtures. See Ari Natter, Energy Efficiency: Senate Legislation on
Appliance Standards Draws Fire from Energy Department, EPA, 40 Env’t. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at
679 (Mar. 27, 2009).
50. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 124-34 (discussing barriers to changing personal behavior).
51. See id. at 125-26.
52. See id. at 130-31.
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environmentally benign way.53 Often individuals resist changing their
behavior because they disbelieve the reason for the behavior change or
they question the legitimacy of the norm underlying the change.54 There
are also social norms like the autonomy and reciprocity norms that get in
the way of the environmental protection norm, the compliance with law
norm, and the personal responsibility norm, norms which might
otherwise encourage good environmental behavior.55
There is one other barrier to good environmental behavior that
particularly impedes compliance with the energy conservation norm.
Thus, to the extent individuals depend on enhancing their own self worth
or earning the esteem of others to motivate good behavior, conserving
energy in their homes, for example by turning off lights or changing
light bulbs, means they will not receive the positive regard of their
neighbors and friends because no one will observe their actions.56 “The
evidence suggests that esteem matters; many individuals care what
others think of them.”57 If external praise is not there, then it is less
likely that an individual will feel proud of her good behavior and will
engage in it.58
B. Structural Problems with CFLs
There are specific structural problems with CFLs that trigger the
general barriers to individuals conserving energy by changing light
bulbs. Some of these problems relate to the cost of CFLs and others to
53. Id. at 127-29 (discussing how people overestimate their knowledge about a particular
problem, make stereotypical decisions and then self-select information to support those conclusions,
simplify complexities, suffer from both alarmist and optimistic biases which affect how they assess
the probability of an event occurring, and generally filter out ordinary activities).
54. See Christopher A. Deabler, The Normative and Legal Deficiencies of “Public Morality,”
19 J.L. & POL. 23, 34-35 (2003) (“Though we may be motivated to adopt certain normative
frameworks, they have to be justified cognitively to ourselves if they are to legitimately govern
behavior. This framework must consist of a justification of norms generally and the justification of
their societal implementation.”).
55. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 151-52 (discussing how these norms can block compliance
with the environmental protection norm).
56. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1299-1300 (noting that “face-to-face contact and behavioral
feedback” increase the opportunities to signal or gain esteem). Changing light bulbs can be
contrasted with curbside recycling where the visibility of the action plays an important role in
engaging in it. See id. at 1279 (“To the extent that garnering neighbors’ esteem or signaling one’s
reputation motivates a potential recycler, visible curbside recycling is a wonderful tool . . . . Those
who do not recycle are visible noncooperators.”).
57. Id. at 1290. “Cooperative behavior typically increases when opportunities to communicate
esteem (or lack of it) increase . . . .” Id.
58. See id. at 1283 (noting a positive “correlation” between the level of recycling intensity
and the extent to which “an individual feels . . . proud about being environmentally responsible”
(citing Daniel Scott, Equal Opportunity, Unequal Results: Determinants of Household Recycling
Intensity, 31 ENV’T & BEHAV. 267, 284 (1999))).

2009]

COMPACT FLUORESCENT BULBS

953

inconvenience;59 still others are uniquely associated with the product’s
design features.60 While CFL technology “has improved in the last
decade, the bulbs do not replicate the performance of incandescents, the
bulbs to which most people are accustomed.”61 These problems with
CFLs can neutralize any guilt an individual may feel about not
conforming to the energy conservation norm, which might otherwise
propel her to switch bulbs.62
For example, CFLs can be three to ten times more expensive than
traditional incandescent light bulbs, which can dissuade even the most
ardent adherent to the energy conservation norm from acquiring them.63
It takes longer for a CFL to start up than a conventional incandescent
bulb, most of them buzz, and many people find the color of the light they
emit and their shape objectionable.64 CFLs also get dimmer over time65
and can damage textiles and fabrics that contain light-sensitive dyes or
pigments.66 Because CFLs offer consumers a lighting alternative that
they perceive as not furthering their self-interest due to the bulbs’ cost
59. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 1296 (“Increasing convenience seems more effective than
most persuasive techniques aimed at increasing participation[,] . . . [and it] appears to result in
sustained behavioral change.”).
60. See Leora Broydo Vestel, The Bulb That Saved the Planet May Be a Little Less Than
Billed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at A1 (recounting problems that purchasers of CFLs are
encountering and saying that people who thought they could save the planet by screwing in a CFL
“are finding the new compact fluorescent bulbs anything but simple”).
61. Tom Zeller Jr., Some Special Handling Required, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at A12.
62. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 16, at 83 (noting that guilt is the primary
“internal enforcement mechanism” inhibiting norm violations); see also id. at 85 (noting that the
possibility that there may be confusion about the desired specific behavior may make any norm of
good environmental behavior ambiguous, which can lessen the guilt an offender might otherwise
feel from her deviant behavior).
63. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Residential Buildings,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/residential/lighting.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009); see also
Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 97
(2001) (stating that “the extent to which consumers will in fact pay more for ‘green’ products and
services is unclear”).
64. STEFAN FASSBINDER, LEONARDO ENERGY, HOW EFFICIENT ARE COMPACT
FLUORESCENT LAMPS? 8 (2008), available at http://www.leonardo-energy.org/webfm_send/219;
L.J. SANDHAL ET AL., PAC. NW. NAT’L LAB., COMPACT FLUORESCENT LIGHTING IN AMERICA:
LESSONS LEARNED ON THE WAY TO MARKET 2.1, 2.3 (2006), available at
http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-15730.pdf.
65. H. STERLING BURNETT & AMANDA BERG, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, LIGHTS
OUT FOR THOMAS EDISON 1 (2008), http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba637.pdf.
66. See M. Khazova & J.B. O’Hagan, Optical Radiation Emissions from Compact
Fluorescent Lamps, 131 RADIATION PROTECTION DOSIMETRY 521, 521 (2008), available at
http://rpd.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/131/4/521.pdf (noting that CFLs produce small amounts of
ultraviolet radiation); U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., CARE AND MAINTENANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
ARTWORK IN THE FINE ARTS COLLECTION § 3.4 (2005), available at
http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/pbs/GSA_FineArts_3_Textiles.pdf (discussing ways by which to
protect textiles from ultraviolet light sources, including fluorescent lights).
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and unsatisfactory attributes, it is less likely that they will replace their
inexpensive, perfectly satisfactory incandescent bulbs.67
These problems might be overcome by buying the right bulb, but
the packaging information about CFL performance is too technical and
hard for the average consumer to understand.68 Consumers need the
equivalent of a Rosetta stone to decipher the differences among CFLs
with respect to the quality of their light, their cost, and turn-on-time to
figure out which CFL each should select.69
Another problem with CFLs is that each CFL bulb contains an
average of four milligrams of mercury.70 Although a naturally occurring
element, human exposure to high levels of mercury can damage the
brain, heart, kidneys, and immune system;71 while birds and mammals
exposed to high levels of methylmercury72 can experience reduced
reproduction, retarded growth, abnormal behavior, and even death.73 The
presence of mercury means that used or damaged CFLs should be
specially recycled and not disposed of in the garbage where they would
end up in a landfill or in a waste incinerator.74 However, to date, there
are very few sites where CFLs can be recycled;75 most of these locations
can only be found by going online.76 The need to recycle CFLs adds to
67. See Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 16, at 521 n.13 (“Research on
seat belt use, smoking, and other behaviors suggests that major shifts can occur where the behavior
change will benefit the individual. Where the harms of an individual’s behavior are externalized, or
where habits or other barriers exist to self-interested change, influencing behavior may be far more
difficult.”).
68. See Vestel, supra note 60 (quoting a consumer of a CFL as saying, “We’re both collegeeducated and pay attention to labels[, but] . . . [i]t feels like someone forgot to put a place to find the
information.”).
69. Id.; see also Zeller, supra note 61 (finding the statement by experts at Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute that CFLs required “a little insight and planning” to be an “understatement”).
70. ENERGY STAR, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: INFORMATION ON COMPACT
FLORESCENT LIGHT BULBS (CFLS) AND MERCURY 1 (2008), http://www.energystar.gov/ia/
partners/promotions/change_light/downloads/Fact_Sheet_Mercury.pdf.
71. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Mercury: Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/mercury/
about.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
72. Methylmercury is produced when mercury in the air is deposited in water where “certain
microorganisms can change it into methylmercury, a highly toxic form [of mercury] that builds up
in fish, shellfish[,] and animals that eat fish.” Id.
73. Id.
74. See Energy Star, Answers: What Are the Mercury Emissions Caused by Humans? Do
CFLs that End Up in a Landfill Contribute to These Emissions?, http://energystar.custhelp.com/cgibin/energystar.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=5411&p_created=1220627774 (last visited
Oct. 20, 2009) (stating that the EPA estimates that if all 290 million CFLs sold in 2007 were sent to
landfill sites, only 0.1%, or 0.13 metric tons, of mercury emissions would be added to the United
States’ annual average of 104 tons).
75. See, e.g., Stephanie Rosenbloom, Home Depot Offers Recycling for Compact Fluorescent
Bulbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2008, at C1 (stating that only two percent of CFLs are recycled).
76. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Mercury-Containing Light Bulb (Lamp) Collection
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their inconvenience.
Even though, in theory, the mercury from damaged or improperly
disposed of CFLs is offset by the reduction in mercury emissions from
power plants because of CFL use,77 improper disposal of CFLs does
release mercury into the environment.78 The mercury in CFLs poses
additional problems should one break in the home where the amount of
mercury released under those circumstances can exceed EPA guidelines
for chronic exposure to mercury.79 A broken CFL triggers complex
cleaning procedures, including clearing the room of people and pets and
sealing broken bulbs in plastic before disposal.80 Mercury in CFLs
additionally creates a conflict between the norms of energy conservation
and environmental protection.81 A conflict between norms makes it
difficult for even the most ardent environmentalist to figure out what the
“right” action is.82
Therefore, despite their obvious economic benefit to the individual
and wider social benefit of reducing energy consumption, getting
individuals to make the effort, spend the money, and adopt what could
be seen as the less appealing option of swapping out their light bulbs for
CFLs is not a frictionless endeavor. Nonetheless, it still may be easier to
get individuals to replace a single incandescent light with a CFL than to
turn off lights or to refrain from buying electronic appliances, which

and Recycling Programs Where You Live, http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/wastetypes/
universal/lamps/live.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (providing links to sites where damaged or
worn out bulbs can be recycled).
77. Energy Star, Compact Florescent Light Bulbs (CFLs) and Mercury,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=cfls.pr_cfls_mercury (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). Based on
the United States’ coal usage, the power consumed by a CFL is estimated to amount to 1.2
milligrams of mercury released into the environment; whereas a conventional incandescent light
bulb results in the release of 5.8 milligrams of mercury. ENERGY STAR, supra note 70, at 1. In areas
of the country where electricity is generated by coal fired power plants, the savings in electricity
would more than offset the mercury released by these bulbs when they are discarded in landfills. Id.
78. Energy Star, supra note 77.
79. DEB STAHLER ET AL., ME. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., MAINE COMPACT FLUORESCENT
LAMP STUDY 7-9, 25-26 (2008), available at http://maine.gov/dep/rwm/homeowner/
cflreport/cflreport.pdf. There seems to be some uncertainty about the health impacts on sensitive
subpopulations at these levels as well as the ability to remove mercury from carpeting and how to
dispose of broken CFLs. Id. at 9 & n.10, 40-41, 63-66.
80. See Zeller, supra note 61 (“If you break a bulb, the Environmental Protection Agency
recommends precautions to avoid mercury exposure: Clear people and pets from the room and open
a window for at least 15 minutes if possible. Avoid vacuuming. Scoop up larger pieces with stiff
paper or cardboard, pick up smaller residue with sticky tape, and wipe the area with a damp cloth.
Put everything into a sealed plastic bag or sealed glass jar.”).
81. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 152 (discussing what happens when there are conflicting
norms).
82. Alex Williams, That Buzz in Your Ear May Be Green Noise, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008,
at ST1 (“Trying to do right by the environment means sorting through the conflicting din.”).
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make our lives so much more convenient and pleasant,83 even though the
social and individual benefits of the latter, in terms of reduced electricity
use, may be greater.
This Article now turns to the three approaches mentioned
previously—smart meters, comparative billing, and personal
incentives—to see if the motivational techniques buried in each of them
can overcome the obstacles that prevent individuals from adhering to the
energy conservation norm by purchasing CFLs.84
C. Identifying and Assessing the Success of Different Approaches to
Overcoming Behavioral and Structural Barriers to Using CFLs
This section of the Article examines three possible approaches to
getting people to reduce their energy consumption by switching to CFLs.
Two of these approaches, smart meters and comparative billing, are
already in use in some areas of the country.85 The third, personal
incentives, has not been applied to reduce energy consumption, but has
been used in a variety of other areas to get people to change their
behavior. Each approach is separately explored below by identifying and
evaluating the effectiveness of their motivational mechanisms.
1. Smart Meters
Smart meters are a part of the so-called “smart grid,” a computerbased network of “sensors and control devices on the nation’s highvoltage transmission networks, coupled with instantaneous
communications among grid managers, generators and customers.”86
The electric power grid currently is a patchwork of individual and
regional transmission systems that has been compared to “your
grandmother’s patchwork quilt, and is about as frayed[,]” and it costs
electricity consumers billions of dollars a year because of congestion and

83. See supra note 34 (discussing the strength of habits).
84. Stern, supra note 34, at 561-62 (stating that getting people to curtail their behavior is
“challenging because it requires continuing reinforcement” unlike a decision to buy a new appliance
which “requires only a one-time incentive”).
85. See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Utilities Turn Their Customers Green, with Envy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2009, at A1 (discussing cities such as Sacramento, Chicago, and Seattle who use
comparative billing methods); Posting of Erik Olsen to Green Inc. Blog, http://
greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/smart-meters-open-market-for-smart-apps/ (Oct. 7, 2008,
16:19 EST) (stating that smart meter programs are underway in Southern California, Oklahoma, and
Western Arkansas).
86. Peter Behr, Technology: The Smart Grid, an ‘Internet for Electricity,’ vs. Business as
Usual, CLIMATEWIRE, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/2009/02/27/4. It will
cost billions of dollars to “[s]marten [u]p” the nation’s electric power grid and require a “‘major
paradigm shift’” in how people consume electricity. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11.
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resultant power outages.87 The current grid needs to be modernized
before anything like smart meters can be effectively used.
Smart meters audit energy consumption in greater detail than
conventional meters.88 They are designed to give the utilities real time
information about their customers’ use of electricity.89 This information
is transmitted to the local utility for monitoring90 and billing purposes. In
the future, smart meters will tell consumers when power is the cheapest
and will even be able start an appliance automatically or turn it off
during a period of peak electricity demand.91
Smart meters have taken time to catch hold in this country, but
programs to deploy them are now underway in several cities.92 For
example, Southern California Edison recently announced its intention to
“install . . . 5.3 million meters between 2009 and 2012 at a cost [to the
utility] of $1.63 billion.”93 Oklahoma Gas & Electric, which serves
765,000 customers in Oklahoma and western Arkansas, has joined
forces with a network of hardware and software providers and a
company that provides Web-based energy monitoring software to help
the utility’s customers lower their energy use and thus lower their
monthly bills.94 Duke Energy has allocated over one billion dollars over
the next five years to install smart meters and other upgrades to its
system.95
However, most of the smart meters now in use do not give
residential electricity users information on their individual use.96 One
87. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11.
88. Posting of Erik Olsen, supra note 85.
89. Id. This discussion does not include the associated environmental costs of producing and
disposing of smart meters.
90. Id. This information helps utilities monitor the distribution of power in its system and thus
hopefully avoid blackouts or other disruptions of electrical service due to higher than anticipated
use. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11.
91. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11.
92. A program on Washington’s Olympic Peninsula that installed various sensors and meters
in 110 homes that allowed people to adjust their thermostats when electrical prices were high saw a
drop of ten percent in their monthly electrical bills and the system’s peak load went down about
fifteen percent. Id. Showing a surprising communitarian spirit when these same customers were told
that cutting back on their electric power usage during a major storm would assure that there would
be some power for all, demand dropped to fifty percent of normal levels. Id.
93. Posting of Erik Olsen, supra note 85.
94. Id.
95. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11.
96. Giving utilities intelligence about an individual household’s electricity consumption has
engendered “‘a fair amount of skepticism’” about whether that information will benefit the utility or
its customers. Phil Taylor, Electricity: Will Americans Learn to Love ‘Smart Grid’?, GREENWIRE,
Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2009/02/27/1. In an effort to explain
customers’ skepticism, one power industry executive stated that “‘[a] lot of people wonder if this is
another thing that’s going to benefit the utility at the expense of the consumer.’” Id.
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exception to this is Oklahoma Gas & Electric, which not only provides
this information directly to its customers, but also includes information
on how the customers’ neighbors are doing.97 Google is promoting a
particular type of smart meter that will display information online
“almost in real time” for its customers.98 Google is lobbying Washington
and other public agencies to invest in smart meters with the hopes that
140 million homes will be equipped with their meters in the next few
years.99
The assumption behind smart meters is that individuals do not
currently have information that makes them aware of how much energy
they are using, and that if they had that information, they would reduce
their use of electricity either because they want to lower their monthly
bills or because, as environmentally responsible individuals, they want
to reduce harmful emissions from coal-fired power plants. Thus,
information is the persuasive tool that smart meters employ, which puts
a premium on the effectiveness of the information that tells consumers
about their excessive use of electricity.100 Although my prior work
emphasizes the importance of information in changing personal
behavior, that work also recognizes the limits of information as a solitary
motivational force.101 Some of these constraints are set forth below.
For example, individuals have a hard time accurately processing
environmental information pertaining to environmental risks, and they
use a variety of heuristics, which can distort the information’s accuracy
and thwart its intended purpose.102 These flawed problem solving
97. Posting of Erik Olsen, supra note 85. A variation on this idea is being promoted by Xcel
Energy to its customers in Colorado, which allows its customers to go online and calculate the
amount of carbon dioxide emitted to meet their individual electrical power and heating needs. Xcel
has 1.6 million customers in the state. But even Xcel admits that “[c]ustomers may choose when
they have that information to use less energy as a way to make personal choices around their carbon
footprint.” Andy Vuong, The Power Behind Figuring Footprint: Xcel Customers Will Soon Be Able
to Calculate Carbon-Dioxide Emissions, DENVER POST, Feb. 16, 2009, at A-23.
98. Posting of Ed Lu to Google Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/02/power-topeople.html (Feb. 9, 2009, 20:39 EST).
99. Id.
100. See Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11 (quoting the Chief Executive of Southern Company,
“[j]ust because you plug in a smart meter . . . doesn’t mean a customer will immediately take smart
actions”).
101. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 165-70; Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence
in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 163 (1993) (stating that the task of educating the public to
accurately calculate the risks of their behavior seems “insurmountable”). But see Bill Marsh, A
Battle Between the Bottle and the Faucet, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at WK14 (quoting Emily
Lloyd, Commissioner of New York City’s Department of Environmental Protection, saying that
“[t]hrough education and motivation you can get people to change their habits,” in this case,
switching from environmentally harmful bottled water to tap water).
102. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 127-28 (discussing various problems people have
processing information, including selecting information that will support some stereotypical
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techniques may make it difficult for individuals to relate their rate of
energy consumption as reflected on their monthly bill, let alone
changing a light bulb, to a reduction in greenhouse gases and then to
global sea level rise, both of which are geographically and temporally
distant. Information about environmental harms and the cause of those
harms is frequently contested; the sources may not be seen as credible
because they have a vested interest in a particular outcome, like the
manufacturers of CFLs who want to sell bulbs, and the information is
often complex and frequently highly technical.103
The complexity and volume of information about environmental
harms make it extremely difficult to convey the magnitude of a
particular environmental risk—here, the need to reduce energy
consumption because of the associated environmental and even national
security concerns.104 Too much information can lead to information
overload, or “green fatigue,”105 and the marginalization of information
about environmental harm, causing people to tune out the message.106 To
the extent that purchasing CFLs is tied to global climate change, the
potential consumer finds herself bombarded with information, often
conflicting, about the phenomenon, requiring her to make the seemingly
improbable leap from a single CFL to shrinking glaciers, as noted
previously. Additionally, the climate change debate is becoming
increasingly shrill and dominated by advocates on both sides of the issue
who seek to simplify the message and use alarmist language, often with

conclusion they have reached); see also Stewart, supra note 63, at 141 (“Even if perfectly collected
and disseminated, [information as a regulatory tool] depends on the willingness and ability of
individuals to properly process the information provided accurately and to act on it. People have
limited time, energy, and attention . . . . Also, people use heuristics, including those based on their
prior experiences, to process information and deal with uncertainty. Their perceptions of risks are
affected by socioeconomic variables and by their psychological saliency and accessibility may
produce significant distortions.”).
103. See Martha C. Monroe, Two Avenues for Encouraging Conservation Behaviors, 10 HUM.
ECOLOGY REV. 113, 119 (2003). (“Durable behavior, which is the result of effortful information
processing (i.e. elaboration), is more achievable when cognitive involvement is high, arguments are
strong, sources are credible, topics are relevant, message is clear, distractions are few, and
comparisons are favorable.”).
104. Stewart, supra note 63, at 141 (“Environmental problems are inherently complex and are
often characterized by significant uncertainties. Yet, efforts to communicate fully such complexities
and uncertainties would produce information overload, leading people to simply disregard or
discount the communication or distort it through simplification.”).
105. Williams, supra note 82.
106. Stewart, supra note 63, at 140; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and
Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 627 (1999) (“With respect to
information, less may be more. If information is not provided in a clear and usable form, it may
actually make people less knowledgeable than they were before, producing overreactions, or
underreactions, based on an ability to understand what the information actually means.”).
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negative effects on the listener.107
The content of information and the context in which it is presented
are critical for information to be effective.108 With respect to
environmental information, it is particularly important that the
information’s content connect an individual’s behavior to whatever the
environmental problem is and show how a change in that behavior may
diminish the problem.109 It also helps if the information shows that other
people in similar situations are “doing their fair share”110 and that
behaving in a more environmentally responsible way will not make the
individual look like a “sucker.”111 Those requirements are difficult to
satisfy here. Connecting a single light bulb to global climate change is
challenging for even the most knowledgeable consumer, while the cost
and intrusiveness of collecting information about other people’s
behavior112 and the fact that people change light bulbs in the privacy of
the home means there is no way of knowing if anyone else is engaging
in the same activity.
For information to change behavior, it must, among other things,
“resonate[] with the values of the recipient,”113 come from a trusted
source,114 and inform the individual of what the correct behavior is.115
Again, information as a motivational tool to change the level at which
individuals consume energy is in trouble. The extent to which energy
conservation information does not resonate with the values of those who
measure their self-worth by material consumption may create a problem
107. See Vandenbergh, supra note 34, at 1138 (complaining that alarmist language “can have a
‘boomerang effect’”); Stewart, supra note 63, at 139-40 (noting a problem with negative
information, such as “disclosure of health risks,” is that they are “uninformative (because they fail
to convey the magnitude of the risks posed by different substances) and alarmist,” and that “too
much information may overwhelm consumers, or simply cause them to disregard it entirely”).
108. See Shuman, supra note 101, at 162 (“[P]eople tend to evaluate information based upon
the way the information is framed.”). Cf. Vandenbergh, supra note 34, at 1134-35 (commenting on
the ineffectiveness of eco-labels and stating “several studies have concluded that eco-labels have
little effect on consumer behavior[,] . . . unless most or all other factors (e.g., the price and quality
of the good) are equal”).
109. Vandenbergh, supra note 34, at 1123-24.
110. Id. at 1124.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1123 (“[G]athering information on the contribution of any one individual often is
prohibitively expensive and intrusive.”).
113. P. Wesley Schultz & Lynnette Zelezny, Reframing Environmental Messages to be
Congruent with American Values, 10 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 126, 134 (2003); see also id. at 131
(criticizing environmental messages for stressing altruism because they ask people “to give up
personal convenience or comfort in order to address the problem”).
114. Paul C. Stern, Understanding Individuals’ Environmentally Significant Behavior, 35
ENVTL. L. REP. 10785, 10789 (2005).
115. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1296-97 (explaining that face-to-face communication and
feedback mechanisms result in greater norm compliance than the provision of information).
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for those individuals. People who do not trust utilities as a source of
information may summarily reject utility-sponsored information.116 The
problem of trust is aggravated here because utilities have a direct interest
in getting people to use smart meters as a way of reducing discretionary
energy consumption; otherwise they must either buy power in the spot
market during periods of peak demand or build expensive new power
plants that often are not used except during heavy energy use.117
Many of these problems with relying on information to persuade
consumers to reduce the amount of energy they consume by switching
the type of light bulbs they use can be overcome, for example, by
carefully crafting the message to point out the immediate direct benefit
to the consumer of lower electricity bills. This is especially true where
consumers are already environmentally socialized—that is, already
adherents of the norm of individual environmentally responsible
behavior and practitioners of other good environmental behavior like
recycling.118 Although it may be difficult for individuals to appreciate
that changing one light bulb can help reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases and thus help save drowning polar bears, information showing this
connection is readily available and accessible to the layperson.119
Connecting a desired new behavior (conserving electricity by changing
light bulbs) with behaviors that are already popular (protecting iconic
species like polar bears) can give a boost to the new behavior.120
In the case of electricity consumption, utilities already have
information about how much electricity their customers are using, so
there is no additional cost for collection, nor is there any additional
intrusion on personal privacy.121 It is also easy for utilities to present that
information in a way that puts their customers’ behavior in the context of
the behavior of other customers or to include bill stuffers that tell stories

116. See Taylor, supra note 96 (attributing the public’s loss of trust in utilities to the rate
increases that happened simultaneously with deregulation).
117. Slevin & Mufson, supra note 11.
118. Stewart, supra note 63, at 135 (stating that environmental socialization information can
create a “demand in favor of environmentally friendly products”).
119. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of converting a
single incandescent bulb to a CFL).
120. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1009
(1995); see also Vandenbergh, supra note 34, at 1163 (“[I]nformation about the dioxin released
from backyard burning may be necessary to generate the public support for community-wide
garbage collection or to fund public information campaigns that inform individuals about materials
that should not be burned in backyard barrels.”).
121. Of course sharing information about individual consumption of electricity with others
runs the risk of violating the privacy norm, which is held in high esteem in this country. See
Babcock, supra note 4, at 159.
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about what people are doing to reduce their electricity consumption.122
This would avoid the problem of people feeling like dupes, if they
engage in the desired behavior.
Other problems may not be overcome so easily. No amount of
information, even information that shows that mercury emissions from
power plants are greater than from a single broken or poorly disposed of
CFL, is likely to overcome an individual consumer’s concern about the
mercury released when that CFL breaks in her home. The direct and
immediate cost of purchasing a CFL compared to a traditional
incandescent bulb will have greater impact on individual consumers than
a reduction in their monthly utility bills because of how people discount
future costs.123 Utilities and manufacturers of bulbs like General Electric
have not been trusted as reliable sources of environmental information
because they have been a major source of environmental problems and
will be seen as direct beneficiaries of any campaign to sell CFLs.124 And
finally, the sheer complexity and amount of technical information
involved in selecting the right CFL for a particular consumer, their
physical unattractiveness, and the inconvenience of both acquiring and
disposing of them cannot be overcome by information alone, even if tied
to another appealing image, such as saving polar bears.
This means that to the extent that smart meters depend on the
information they convey to reduce the amount of electricity individuals
consume, they may not be able to achieve that goal by getting their
customers to buy CFLs because information as a motivational tool is too
problematic.
2. Comparative Consumer Information
Like the smart meter method, this approach also relies on
information to persuade utility customers to decrease their use of
electricity. However, the way in which the information is presented to
the customer invokes additional motivators of personal action: the
conformity norm, competition, and, to some extent, the use of shame.
Both Oklahoma Gas & Electric and Sacramento Municipal Utility
122. This approach is discussed in greater detail in the next part of the Article. See infra Part
III.C.2.
123. See Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and CrossCultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 89 (2005) (discussing the “availability heuristic” and
how peoples’ perceptions of risks are influenced by whether the risk is “cognitively available”); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 870-71, 875 (2006)
(stating that people are likely to “treat the risk as essentially zero” and pay little to prevent it,
especially when “the costs of precautions are incurred immediately” while its “benefits will not be
enjoyed until decades later”).
124. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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District (“SMUD” or “the Utility”) are trying to motivate their
residential customers to reduce energy consumption by giving them
information not only about their own use of electricity, but also
information about how much electricity their neighbors are using.125
SMUD’s residential customers receive monthly bills that compare their
level of energy consumption against one hundred of their neighbors who
live in comparable size homes and who use the same heating fuel.126 The
monthly statement also contains information that separately compares
the household’s level of energy consumption with twenty neighbors who
have been singled out because of their efficiency in conserving
energy.127 The Utility resorted to this tactic after years of trying to get its
customers to reduce energy use through other tactics, such as offering
rebates for energy saving appliances.128 SMUD customers who received
these personalized reports in their bills reduced their energy use by two
percent compared to those who were sent standard statements.129
SMUD’s success has prompted utilities in ten other major metropolitan
areas, including Chicago and Seattle, to adopt the same program.130
Oklahoma Gas & Electric, as mentioned earlier, provides similar
comparative information on energy use within a neighborhood.131
The use of comparative billing information taps into the conformity
norm.132 “‘It is fundamental and primitive . . . . The mere perception of
the normal behavior of those around us is very powerful.’”133 The
conformity norm134 arises because “people ‘frequently use the beliefs,
attitudes, and actions of others, particularly similar others, as a standard
125. See Kaufman, supra note 85 (describing SMUD’s program); Posting of Erik Olsen, supra
note 85.
126. See Kaufman, supra note 85.
127. Id.
128. Id. (reporting on a 2004 experiment by Robert Cialdini, a social psychologist at Arizona
State, where the only message left hanging on doorknobs in a middle-class San Diego suburban
neighborhood that had a significant effect on reducing energy consumption was the one that said the
individual’s neighbors had already taken steps to reduce energy consumption; messages exhorting
people to save the earth or even save money had no significant effect).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
132. A shorthand way of describing the conformity norm is “[i]f everyone is doing it, it must
be a sensible thing to do.” Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 16, at 112 n.198. Like habits,
the conformity norm “provides an efficient ‘decisional shortcut.’” Id. (quoting Robert B. Cialdini et
al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in
Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015 (1990)).
133. Kaufman, supra note 85 (quoting Robert Cialdini). Kaufman cites the example of one
SMUD customer who, after receiving her personal statement, bought a new energy efficient washer
and dryer, put her lights on timers, and unplugged her “kegerator” (a draft beer cooler) and whose
energy consumption is now equal to her neighbors. Id.
134. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 16, at 112.
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of comparison against which to evaluate the correctness of their own
beliefs, attitudes, and actions.’”135 Therefore, one way to increase an
individual’s good environmental behavior is to provide information on
how well others are performing the same task as well as feedback on the
individual’s own performance.136 This is exactly what the two utilities
are doing.
The other motivational force that the two utilities have tapped into
is competition. “‘As Americans, we are good at . . . competition . . . . It’s
the part of this culture that people really understand . . . .’”137 For
decades, colleges have encouraged competition, both between different
schools and among dormitories on the same campus, in an effort to
reduce overall energy consumption.138 Recently, those collegiate
competitions have become even more intense. For example, at Central
College in Pella, Iowa, where students, who compete to see which suite
of rooms in a “green dorm” has the lowest level of energy consumption,
are going off campus to charge their cell phones.139 Although individual
homeowners are less likely to compete, various households in three
Massachusetts towns (Medford, Arlington, and Cambridge) who
participated in a competitive game called “Energy Smackdown” reduced
their energy use up to sixty-six percent during the course of the yearlong game.140 One positive result of lifestyle changing games like
Energy Smackdown is that even after the competition ends, the
contestants continue to practice good environmental behavior because
they have formed new habits, which are neither costly nor inconvenient
to continue.141

135. Id. at 114 (quoting Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values, and
Principles, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 200, 213 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989));
see also supra note 132.
136. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 1290 (“The evidence suggests that esteem matters; many
individuals care what others think of them. Cooperative behavior typically increases when
opportunities to communicate esteem (or lack of it) increase . . . .”).
137. Kaufman, supra note 85 (quoting the executive director of the nonprofit responsible for
the Energy Smackdown program). “Energy Smackdown” is a reality series game designed to
encourage energy conservation that is shown on local cable TV. Id. The game discussed in the
article involved ten families from three different Massachusetts communities (Cambridge, Medford,
and Arlington). Id.
138. Another example of environmental competitions between colleges and universities is
“RecycleMania,” in which schools compete over a ten-week period to reduce the amount of
resources they use and waste they produce, by transforming a waste reduction message into a
message any college student can understand—“beating the cross town rival.” RecycleMania,
http://www.recyclemaniacs.org/overview.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
139. Kaufman, supra note 85.
140. Id.
141. See Dave Copeland, Neighborly Competition: Residents in 3 Communities Try to Outdo
Each Other in the Energy Smackdown, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2008, at H1.

2009]

COMPACT FLUORESCENT BULBS

965

While the conformity norm and competition may inspire
individuals to improve their energy conservation performance when the
information about their performance is positive or they win, the
effectiveness of negative comparative information, or losing, to some
extent depends on the individual feeling ashamed of her poor
performance.142 However, shame is an extremely problematic
motivator.143 On the one hand, fear of embarrassment or public
humiliation can motivate individuals to obey minor laws like municipal
ordinances exhorting pet owners to scoop their pet’s poop and not to
litter, and can encourage individuals to avoid behaviors that may be
harmful to others.144 On the other hand, there are serious problems with
using humiliation as a sanction that severely undermines its usefulness,
especially where what is essentially private behavior (using too much
electricity) is broadcast to others, as it is in the case of comparative
billing and energy competitions.145
At an extreme level, public humiliation can cripple the embarrassed
individual’s sense of self-esteem146 because they have not only “lowered
[themselves] . . . in [their] own eyes” but also “in the eyes of other
people.”147 There can be negative spillover effects on the offender’s
immediate family, who may have played a limited role in the offending
behavior.148 Additionally, using public humiliation to shame a profligate
142. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 1299-1300 (suggesting that neighborhood recycling
competitions would not be effective to increase recycling if individuals who performed under par
did not care what their neighbors thought of them).
143. See Deni Smith Garcia, Three Worlds Collide: A Novel Approach to the Law, Literature,
and Psychology of Shame, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 105, 121 (1999) (“Shame, the emotion,
actually falls along a continuum of emotions ranging from embarrassment on one end to
mortification on the other.”); see also Babcock, supra note 4, at 159-65 (discussing shame at
length).
144. Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of Emotional Legal Decision
Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1064
(2006) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE
LAW (2004)); see also Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
733, 752 (1998) (arguing that when the deterrent value of shaming is added to “the moralizing
effects of widespread publicity of offenders’ wrongdoing,” shaming performs an educative function
for the community and thus may contribute to maintaining social order). But see Dan M. Kahan &
Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 373 (1999) (“Shaming produces highly imperfect
deterrence . . . .”).
145. Indicating the sensitivity of individuals to embarrassment or humiliation, SMUD
discontinued the use of frowny faces to indicate poor energy conservation performance because the
company received too many complaints about them. See Kaufman, supra note 85.
146. Dan M. Kahan, Shaming White Collar Offenders, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 51, 52 (1999).
147. Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special
Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 369, 371 (1999).
148. Joshua Andrix, Note, Negotiated Shame: An Inquiry into the Efficacy of Settlement in
Imposing Publicity Sanctions on Corporations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1857, 1870 (2007); Garcia,
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user of electricity in the eyes of her community seems totally out of
proportion with the deviant behavior in this situation—the failure to
conform to the norm of energy conservation—and thus runs the risk of
violating a bedrock principle of punishment theory: proportionality.149
In addition, there are practical problems associated with using
public embarrassment as a way to improve personal behavior in any
situation, but particularly here. For example, for shame to have a wide
educative, behavioral changing effect, there must be a community that
agrees the offender’s actions are bad;150 otherwise public humiliation can
lead to an increase in bad behavior in a show of solidarity.151 The
extravagant use of energy referred to earlier in this Article152 makes it
doubtful that there is wide support for the energy conservation norm, let
alone support for it in any particular community. There must also be a
community whose good opinion the offender values and does not want to
lose.153 In our atomistic culture, this community may not exist.154 Even
when there are such communities, it is highly unlikely that individuals
will publicly humiliate a friend or a neighbor for what may seem to
many as a minor, let alone private matter: wasting electricity. There is
also a risk that if too many people in a community are being humiliated,
that is more neighbors are receiving poor report cards from their utilities
as opposed to good ones, the deterrent value of negative reports will
drop.155 Enough bad report cards also create little incentive for
individuals to deviate from what appears to be a norm of poor
environmental performance, lest they look like a patsy or “dupe.”156
supra note 143, at 118 (“[S]haming is particularly stigmatic to innocent third-party relations given
the public nature of a shaming.”).
149. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 144, at 385 (stating that the severity of shaming’s
impacts could undermine the goal of making the penalty proportionate to the offense).
150. Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 605, 648 (2004).
151. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1933 (1991) (arguing that shaming can actually result in an increase in violations).
152. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
153. See Garvey, supra note 144, at 753 (“As for general deterrence, much depends on the
nature of the relevant community. At one extreme, a community may be so atomized that no one
cares very much about what anyone thinks of anyone else . . . . Shame is unlikely to play a
significant role in the social life of so thin an association.”); see also Karp, supra note 33, at 316
(arguing that the effectiveness of shame depends on ostracizing or excluding an individual from a
community).
154. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 151, at 1916; David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Shaming
Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 105, 108 (2005) (noting that both
population diversity and political polarization in the United States pose challenges to the
effectiveness of shaming).
155. Massaro, supra note 151, at 1930-31 (discussing how when shaming sanctions become
too common, they lose their deterrent value).
156. See Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 16, at 112 (“[P]erceptions of widespread
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Therefore, despite some positive attributes of public embarrassment
as a means of encouraging good environmental behavior, the negative
qualities of publicly humiliating someone may well overwhelm its
usefulness as a means of encouraging energy conservation, let alone
swapping out light bulbs. To the extent that comparative billing depends
in some circumstances on triggering shame for its effectiveness,
notwithstanding the power of the conformity norm and competition, the
negative aspect of shame as a motivational tool may lessen the
approach’s effectiveness as well.
3. Personal Incentives
Personal incentives are a potential third way to encourage
individuals to buy CFLs;157 the incentives can be economic or noneconomic.158 Economic incentives play to the consumer’s pocket book;
while the non-economic incentives, like awards or other types of praise,
are directed at the consumer’s sense of self-esteem or desire for the
esteem of her community.159
The goal of giving someone an economic incentive to engage in
good environmental behavior is to overcome a situation where “the
payoff” from a public environmental good like clean air, a benefit of
reducing energy consumption, is “less tangible than direct economic
gain.”160 The added inducement of money (like a refund), or something
of value (a redeemable coupon), combined with the self-esteem that is
generated when one engages in a socially responsible action, can be
enough to “tip[] the cost-benefit equation” in favor of the desired
action.161 In fact, economic incentives may be more effective than
education, other forms of persuasion, or feedback in changing

noncompliance undermine compliance.”); see also id. at 114 (“[C]ooperation decreases if compliers
view themselves as ‘dupes.’”).
157. See Shuman, supra note 101, at 153 (favoring positive rewards over punishment).
158. This analysis does not include changes in CFL design, qualities, or initiatives that would
make their acquisition and disposal easier. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text (noting
several design problems that inhibit more widespread use of CFLs). As discussed later in this
Article, these may be the only changes that will induce people into swapping out their light bulbs.
See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
159. If giving people an economic incentive so that they have more money in their pocket or a
redeemable coupon at Starbucks is viewed as increasing their opportunities, then this may make it
more likely that they will make a moral commitment to engage in the desired behavior. See Robert
D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79
OR. L. REV. 1, 19 (2000) (stating that when people see a large enough increase in their opportunities
they are more likely to make moral commitments).
160. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1250.
161. See id. at 1294 (arguing that the deposit money people receive for returning bottles and
the “psychic benefit of recycling[] tips the cost-benefit equation”).
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behavior.162
While the monthly reduction in an individual’s electric bill from the
use of a more efficient light bulb should be a sufficient economic
incentive to buy CFLs, clearly it is not because individuals are still not
purchasing them. Therefore, additional economic encouragement may be
necessary. For example, stores where CFLs are sold could issue coupons
for something other than a CFL, redeemable either at the place the
purchase was made or some place else, like Starbucks, a local restaurant,
or a movie theater. Retailers could also refund a portion of the purchase
price of a CFL, issue redeemable coupons for the purchase of
replacement bulbs, or offer a reduced price when more than one bulb is
purchased.163
There are problems, however, with using economic incentives to
motivate individuals to make good environmental choices like
purchasing CFLs. Offering individuals an economic reward for engaging
in good behavior can “undermine or ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation” to
do a good thing.164 Using economic incentives may also weaken the
personal or communal psychological advantages of carrying out a
supportive action and thereby deter the intended behavior.165 But if the
economic incentive is designed not to be too coercive or controlling166
and is proportionate to the desired task,167 intrinsic motivation may not
162. Stern, supra note 34, at 562. But see Carlson, supra note 15, at 1299-1300 (“The most
effective techniques for increasing norm compliance, face-to-face contact and behavioral feedback,
play on the human desire to be well-regarded by others. These techniques seem then to work on
both levels by increasing the opportunities to signal or gather esteem, while simultaneously
increasing attitudes in favor of the behavior.”).
163. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 1298 (“[I]f an activity is already convenient, such as
residential energy conservation, but requires sustained behavioral change, then individual feedback
about energy usage may increase compliant behavior, as may rebates for energy efficient
behavior.”). But see Stewart, supra note 63, at 99 (noting that deposit and refund techniques to
encourage recycling require people to pay an initial fee when they purchase the item, which is only
refunded when they properly dispose of the item or return it).
164. Stern, supra note 34, at 564. But see id. at 565 (commenting that when people do not have
an intrinsic motivation to engage in good environmental behavior, a reduction in that motivation is
irrelevant, and that if the desired new behavior is costly, there is little incentive for people to engage
in the activity voluntarily).
165. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 16, at 608 (“[C]are must be taken to
ensure that the psychological effects of economic incentives do not undermine their effectiveness.
For example, in some circumstances financial inducements appear to undermine the psychic
benefits an individual receives for performing a cooperative act and may discourage, rather than
encourage, the targeted behavior.”).
166. Stern, supra note 34, at 564 (“[R]esearch shows that financial rewards reduce intrinsic
motivation when the reward is contingent on engaging in an activity, completing a task or, under
certain conditions, performing well.”); see also id. at 565 (“Rewards are most likely to crowd out
intrinsic motivation when they are ‘controlling,’ meaning that the recipient experiences the reward
as pressuring or coercing her actions or controlling the manner, time, or place of the activity.”).
167. Id. at 565.
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be decreased, allowing the individual to feel an increase in self-esteem
when she engages in the desired activity.168
Another problem with using economic incentives to spur good
behavior is that their effect can be short-lived.169 Unless the behavioral
change (swapping out light bulbs) becomes permanent through the
internalization of a concrete norm of energy conservation and the new
behavior becomes a habit, the bad behavior (continuing to buy the
cheaper, more aesthetically pleasing light bulb) will return the moment
the incentive (refund, coupon, or discount) is withdrawn.170 In fact,
empirical studies show that economic incentives only “produce
moderate, rather than dramatic, effects on individual environmental
behaviors.”171
Increasing the price of incandescent bulbs through a surcharge or
tax might encourage the purchase of CFLs.172 The additional money
could be applied to assist in recycling worn out or broken CFLs and thus
lessen the inconvenience associated with disposing of CFLs. Increasing
the cost of undesirable behavior “tends to reduce the bad behavior and
increase the good behavior.”173 To the extent that people are sensitive to
prices, increasing the price of incandescent bulbs could spur people to
buy CFLs.174 However, raising the price of incandescent bulbs might
have a regressive impact on lower income consumers, as it might price
both types of bulbs out of their reach.
Non-economic incentives, like awards and praise, do not crowd out
the intrinsic motivation to engage in good behavior and have no
regressive effect.175 SMUD uses smiley faces on utility bills to reflect
the success, or lack of success, of each individual household’s efforts to
168. Id. at 565-66.
169. Id. at 562.
170. See id. (commenting that the use of a monetary incentive can cause a rapid change in
behavior, but its withdrawal can end that good behavior just as quickly). This reaction can be as true
for household energy conservation as it is for carpooling, using public transportation, or recycling.
Id.
171. Id. at 560. Most experiments produce only a ten to thirty percent increase in positive
environmental behavior across different subject groups. Id.
172. But see Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 16, at 604-05 (calling
environmental taxes “politically radioactive”).
173. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1297; see also id. (stating that “it may be possible to emulate
bottle bills in other contexts,” such as using energy efficiency rebates rather than charging for
“excessive use”).
174. See Shankar Vedantam, On Climate, Symbols Can Overshadow Substance, WASH. POST,
May 17, 2008, at A1 (commenting that people are more sensitive to prices than they are to ethical
and environmental concerns, and observing that interest in hybrid cars surged when gas reached
four dollars a gallon). But see Carlson, supra note 15, at 1293 (stating that reducing barriers to
recycling is more effective than making it more expensive to dispose of garbage).
175. Stern, supra note 34, at 565.
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conserve energy.176 These smiley faces function like a reward,
comparable to the gold stars children receive from their parents for
bringing home a good report card or doing household chores, that
enhances the individual’s self-esteem as well as her standing in the
community when that information is shared with her neighbors.
Another example of a non-economic personal incentive that might
encourage the purchase of CFLs is a public display of the good behavior.
An example of this might be a bumper sticker recognizing the driver’s
contribution to fighting global climate change through the purchase of
CFLs. The CFL bumper sticker would be similar to those extolling the
car’s occupant for having an “honor roll student” or for supporting a
particular cause or political candidate.177 Alternatively, the names of
customers who bought a CFL might be prominently displayed near
where CFLs are sold, informing a wider audience of their good behavior
and perhaps, in the process, enticing others to behave the same way so
they can be part of a similar display.178
Each of these non-economic incentives not only enhances the
individual’s self-esteem because others have recognized her good
environmental behavior, but also raises her community standing because
she gains her community’s esteem for engaging in responsible
environmental behavior that benefits the community at large.179 The
individual so regarded feels good about her selfless act of buying a CFL,
which increases the likelihood that she might engage in that behavior
again.180
176. See Kaufman, supra note 85. The number of smiley faces on a utility bill reflects how
well the household is doing on energy conservation. Thus, high performance earns two smiley
faces; while good performance earns one. Id.
177. Another example of positive labeling is the “I voted” stickers that inform others of the
wearer’s good civic behavior.
178. Cf. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1294 (“The visibility of returning recyclable containers also
provides people with good reputation-signaling or esteem-enhancing opportunities.”).
179. Cf. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 16, at 116 (commenting on the
effectiveness of programs that reward regulated entities for complying with environmental
regulatory requirements and that publishing the number of complying companies can create an
impression of widespread compliance); Cooter, supra note 159, at 19 (“To induce people to
internalize values, the state must reward citizens for having civic virtue. For this purpose, officials
bestow honors, awards, and praise, as well as their opposites (dishonor, punishments, and
condemnations).”).
180. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 1232 (“Recyclers get either intrinsic satisfaction for doing
the right thing, approval from friends and neighbors for their environmentally correct behavior, or
both.”); Fishman, supra note 40, at 76 (“Buying and using [a CFL] helps save the world—and also
saves the customer money—with no compromise on quality. Selflessness and self-satisfaction,
twirled into a single $3 purchase.”); Walmart Fact Sheets, supra note 31. But see Richard A. Posner,
Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
553, 560 (1998) (“I do not myself believe that many people do things because they think they are
the right thing to do unless they have first used the plasticity of moral reasoning to align the ‘right’
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As discussed previously, both the esteem of others and self-esteem
are important motivators of good behavior.181 But when the source of
that esteem is withdrawn (no more smiley faces), or is only a one-shot
event (the bumper sticker), then, as in the case of economic incentives,
the individual may not repeat the environmentally responsible behavior
(buying CFLs).182 Indeed, in the case of bumper stickers or public lists,
the temptation to free ride on her one-time good behavior might be
strong enough to allow an individual’s prior irresponsible behavior to
return. Additionally, studies show that the effectiveness of non-monetary
rewards at influencing individual behavior is limited to circumstances
where the new behavior is of low to moderate cost, and where there is a
community norm favoring the new behavior;183 neither of which may be
true in the case of CFLs.
The negative attributes of economic incentives, and the
motivational uncertainty of both economic and non-economic incentives,
put into question their effectiveness as motivational tools to persuade
individuals to consume less electricity, let alone their ability to
overcome the reluctance of people to buy CFLs despite their individual
and social benefits.
D. What Will It Take to Make the “Horse” Buy a CFL?
Each of the motivational tools underlying the initiatives set forth in
this Article—smart meters, comparative billing, and personal
incentives—has drawbacks. This Article suggests that none is sufficient
by itself to overcome the barriers to making individuals conform to the
norm of energy conservation by purchasing a CFL—a conclusion that is
consistent with my prior work in this area. However, it may not be
enough simply to aggregate these persuasive techniques or tailor them to
the target audience, as I previously suggested with respect to getting
people to internalize a new norm of individual environmental

with their self-interest. I do not think that knowledge of what is morally right is motivational in any
serious sense for anyone except a handful of saints . . . . [I]n general[,] you need to appeal to a
person’s altruism, fear, or pride (sometimes moral pride, which is not to be confused with morality)
to explain non-self-interested behavior.”).
181. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 175-79 and
accompanying text.
182. Whether such an individual will feel guilty for her behavior, which, in turn, might
motivate her not to free ride, is open to question. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 43
(2000) (“[N]o well-developed theory of guilt allows us to make predictions about when [it will be
influential] or what kinds of people feel guilt and what kinds of people do not. So . . . we cannot rely
on a theory of guilt for an explanation.”).
183. Stern, supra note 34, at 563.
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responsibility and improve their environmental behavior.184
Instead, for individuals to entertain the thought of purchasing a
CFL, the product will have to be redesigned—its mercury content and
price reduced and its attractiveness and convenience improved. This
conclusion is based both on Wal-Mart’s successful campaign to get its
customers to buy CFLs and on the weakness of the motivational tools
discussed in this Article. Once those structural—Professor Ann
Carlson’s “architectural”185—changes to CFLs have been made, then
information, comparative billing, and various economic and noneconomic personal incentives can play an important role in pushing
individuals to swap out their incandescent bulbs for CFLs.
Wal-Mart has launched a major campaign to get its customers to
buy CFLs and has sold over 260 million of these light bulbs in two and a
half years.186 The box store has tackled each of the structural inhibitors
to purchasing CFLs. For example, Wal-Mart has reduced the cost of
CFLs by offering its own brand at a lower price.187 It has also addressed
the mercury problem by working with CFL manufacturers to reduce
their mercury content.188 Wal-Mart has taken steps to make buying CFLs
easier by reconfiguring the lighting displays in its stores to draw
attention to CFLs, offering interactive displays so customers can
compare CFL qualities and styles, and allowing its customers to
purchase CFLs online.189
Wal-Mart is on the right track. By tackling the consumer barriers
inhibiting the purchase of CFLs head-on and making the product
something individuals want to buy, the company is having a more direct
effect on the purchase of CFLs than by relying solely on a variety of
behavioral incentives to motivate individuals to engage in the desired
environmental behavior. The global lesson learned from the CFL story
for those who seek to improve individual environmental behavior is that
when the barriers to action inhere in the action itself and are not
184. Stern, supra note 114, at 10789 (stating that getting people to change their behavior is
more complex than any single factor, especially if one is trying to influence a substantial portion of
the population).
185. Carlson, supra note 15, at 1254.
186. Walmart Fact Sheets, supra note 31. Wal-Mart has also demonstrated that buying “green,”
when it makes good economic sense to do so, can be a powerful motivator for those at a lower
economic level in our society. See Daniel Gross, Edison’s Dimming Bulbs, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15,
2007, at E22 (“Thus far, green goods have been pitched to the top: expensive Priuses for guilty
yuppies, solar installations for rich techies. But to have real impact, energy-efficiency products need
to make economic sense to those who congregate on the lower rungs of the economic ladder. WalMart’s sales of CFLs proves that energy-efficient goods don’t have to be luxury items.”).
187. Walmart, supra note 47.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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cognitively induced, no amount of motivational inducement can
overcome them until the structural obstacles preventing the individual
from engaging in the good behavior are attended to.
However, this is not to say that information, the desire of
individuals to conform or compete, their need for self-esteem or the
esteem of others, or their receptivity to a good deal have no role in
getting them to swap out their light bulbs. Even after structural changes
are made to CFLs, there still needs to be a reason for an individual to get
up off the couch and go buy one. It is just too early to apply these
motivational tools and expect that individuals will conform to the norm
of energy conservation and behave in a more environmentally
responsible manner by switching light bulbs.
IV. CONCLUSION
My previous articles suggest that relying on a single persuasive tool
to change individual environmental behavior will not work, but that a
combination of techniques, like public education, sanctions, and marketbased incentives, specifically tailored to the desired activity and the
targeted audience may achieve the goal. That conclusion has not fared
well in this Article, where several of these persuasive techniques have
been applied to see if they could motivate individuals to swap out their
light bulbs, even though doing that conforms to the norm of energy
conservation and is the environmentally responsible thing to do. The
conclusion that these motivational tools will not work alone or in the
aggregate when the inhibitors to behavioral change inhere in the product
or activity itself, while a surprise to me, seems intuitively correct. It is
also a conclusion that Professor Ann Carlson’s work on recycling
supports where she says architectural changes—that is changes in how
people recycle—are more important than norms or incentives in getting
people to recycle.190
This does not mean that norms, like the energy conservation norm,
play no role in influencing individual behavior. They do play a role.
However, this Article shows that that role is more limited than I
originally thought. Norms cannot direct how they will be implemented,
especially when the barriers to norm implementation inhere in the
desired behavior. Wal-Mart’s campaign demonstrates that until the
physical impediments to buying CFLs are removed, neither norms nor
persuasive techniques have the strength to overcome the general barriers
to good environmental behavior, let alone the structural barriers to
purchasing CFLs. Therefore, norms not only require the assistance of
190. See generally Carlson, supra note 15.
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external motivators to change behavior, as my prior work concluded, but
to be effective they must also operate on a level playing field where the
obstacles to good environmental behavior have been removed.

